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SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
THIRD DEPARTMENT
In re Clear Channel Communications Inc. et al.'
(decided July 8, 1999)
Petitioners, Clear Channel Communications Inc., brought an
Article 78 proceeding' regarding the determination of Larry J.
Rosen, County Judge of Albany, for excluding television cameras
from a criminal trial Petitioners sought a declaration that the
Civil Rights Law section 52' was a violation of the New York
State Constitution because it prevented audio-visual coverage and
televising of such proceedings.' The Appellate Division, Third
Department, held that the completion of the criminal trial rendered
moot the media company's constitutional challenge to the statute
prohibiting audio-visual coverage and televising of trials.6
Petitioners moved by order to show cause for permission to
conduct audio-visual coverage of People v. McKenna.7 Civil
1 263 A.D.2d 663,692 N.Y.S.2d 812 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Div. July 8, 1999).
2 N.Y. C.P.L.R 7801 (McKinney 1994) (providing in pertinent part that
"[p]rohibition, however, is a traditional exception that serves to restrain judicial
or quasi-judicial officers from acting without jurisdiction or in excess of their
jurisdiction").
3 Clear Channel, 263 A.D.2d at 663, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 812.
4 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAv § 52 (McKinney 1992). This statute provides in
pertinent part:
No person, firm, association or corporation shall televise,
broadcast, take motion pictures or arrange for the televising,
broadcasting, or taking of motion pictures within the state of
proceedings, in which testimony of witnesses by subpoena or
other compulsory process is or may be taken, conducted by a
court, commission, committee, administrative agency or other
tribunal in this state.
Id
' Clear Channel, 263 A.D.2d at 663, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 812.
6 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (stating in pertinent part: "The jurisdiction of the
court of appeals shall be limited to the review of questions of law").
I State of N.Y. v. McKenna, 250 A.D.2d 240, 244, 685 N.Y.S.2d 110. 113 (3d
Dep't 1998), cert. denied, 93 N.Y.2d 855, 710 N.E.2d 1102, 688 N.Y.S.2d 503
(1999).
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Rights Law section 52 prohibited the audio-visual coverage and
televising of such proceeding. 8 Judge Rosen, respondent, granted
leave to intervene, but refused to find section 52 unconstitutional
because legislation allowing the judge discretion to grant
permission for audio-visual coverage9 had expired on June 30,
1997; thus, section 52 could be applied in its entirety.Y'
Finding that "no civil appeal lies from the order entered in this
criminal action," the Court of Appeals dismissed Clear Channel's
appeal of Judge Rosen's decision." Then, Clear Channel
commenced [a] CPLR article 78"2 proceeding in an effort to vacate
the court's order denying audio-visual coverage. 3 Soon after, a
jury acquitted McKenna 4and the State then moved to dismiss the
article 78 petition for mootness."5 The petition was dismissed as
moot by the Appellate Division, thus eliminating the need to rule
on the constitutionality of the statute.'6
The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department,
began its analysis by stating Federal 7 and State 8 constitutions are
based on "the power of a court to declare the law only arises out
of, and is limited to, determining the rights of persons which are
actually controverted in a particular case pending before the
8 N.Y. Civ. RIGHrs LAW § 52 (McKinney 1992).
9 N.Y. JUD. Law § 218.
10 Clear Channel, 263 A.D.2d at'663, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 812.
1 Id.
12 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801 (McKinney 1994).
11 Clear Channel, 263 A.D.2d at 663, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 812.
14 McKenna, 250 A.D.2d at 244, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
"s Clear Channel, 263 A.D.2d at 663, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 812.
16 Id.
17 U.S. CONST. art. III § 2. This provides in pertinent part: "The judicial
powers shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made." Id
18 N.Y. CONST. art. VI § 3. This provides in pertinent part: "The jurisdiction
of the court of appeals shall be limited to the review of questions of law." Id.
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tribunal."' 9 Once a case ceases to have an actual controversy the
case must be rejected for mootness.
In Arizonans For Official English v. Arizonad"0 a state employee
challenged the State of Arizona's constitutional provision that the
state's official language would be English. The federal District
Court held the provision to be unconstitutional."1 While the case
was on appeal the petitioner left government employment.2- The
Supreme Court then vacated and remanded judgment on the
grounds that petitioner's case became moot when she no longer
faced possible disciplinary actions at work. -3
Mootness is dominant in ending a case unless an exception is
met.24 The Supreme Court of the United States defined exceptions
to application of the mootness doctrine in Roe v. Wade."- In Roe,
the action was brought for declaratory and injunctive relief
regarding the constitutionality of the Texas criminal abortion
laws.26 The Court addressed the doctrine of mootness with regard
to a normal pregnancy period.27 The Court found exceptions to
mootness would be based on a significant fact in the litigation, that
the litigation would seldom survive beyond the trial stage, and that
the repetition of cases of a similar nature would elude appellate
review because the significant fact would no longer be present.28
These exceptions that the Court identified allowed the petitioner to
'9 Clear Channel, 263 A.D.2d at 664, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 813 (citing In Re Hearst
Corp., 50 N.Y.2d 707, 713, 409 N.E.2d 876, 877, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 409
(1980)).
20 Arizonans For Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
2 Id at 43 (petitioner was a state employee facing disciplinary sanctions at
work).
2 Id at 44.
23 Id
24 Clear Channel, 263 A.D.2d at 664, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1971) (holding Texas criminal abortion
statutes prohibiting abortion at any stage to be unconstitutional, regardless that
the woman was not currently pregnant).
6 Id at 116.
27 Id at 125 (recognizing that the normal pregnancy period is 266 days).
id (reasoning that the judicial system should not be so inflexible as to deny
justice to a pregnant women solely because the pregnancy would be over before
the court system could play out the case in its entirety).
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avoid dismissal of her appeal simply due to the fact she was no
longer pregnant during the appeal process.29
This logic was echoed on the state level in Hearst Corporation v.
Clyne.3" The Hearst Corporation published the Albany Times-
Union, a daily newspaper, and Shirley Armstrong was a reporter
for that newspaper.3' Armstrong was not allowed into the
courtroom during a defendant's plea of guilty. Armstrong claimed
having been denied access without an opportunity to be heard by
the court.3 2 The New York Court of Appeals found mootness as a
well-rooted grounds for discharge through not only the
Constitutional separation of powers33 but also within the fabric of
the decision making process itself because the guilty plea was
already entered.'"
The New York State courts have adopted the exceptions to the
mootness doctrine identified in Roe by distilling it into three
common factors that were expressed in Hearst.35 The petitioners in
Hearst brought an Article 78 proceeding seeking declaration that
closing the courtroom to the press during the entry of a guilty plea
was illegal.36 The common factors leading to an exception of the
mootness doctrine were pinpointed in Hearst: "(1) a likelihood of
repetition, either between the parties or among other members of
the public; (2) a phenomenon typically evading review; and (3) a
showing of significant or important questions not previously
passed on, i.e., substantial and novel issues.''s3 The court finding
29 Id.
30 Hearst at 713-714, 409 N.E.2d at 877, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 402 (citing In Re
Workman's Comp. Fund, 224 N.Y. 13, 16, 119 N.E. 1027, 1026, (1918);
California v. San Pablo & Tulare RR., 149 U.S. 308,314 (1893)).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
I Id. (reasoning that the rights of parties could not be affected, thus a decision
would carry no weight).
15 Hearst at 714-715, 409 N.E. at 878, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
36 Id. at 712, 409 N.E. at 876, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 401 (involving press being
excluded during an entry of a guilty plea).
37 Id at 714-715, 409 N.E. at 878, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
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none of the requisite exceptions found the petitioners' claim
moot.
38
Clear Channel dealt with a constitutional challenge to a 1952
statute which overrode permissive legislation allowing judges
discretion that had not been utilized for 10 years.39 In Clear
Channel, the issue at trial was whether the completion of the
criminal trial rendered moot the constitutional challenge to a
statute prohibiting audio-visual and television coverage of trials.'
The court did not find any valid exception to override the doctrine
of mootness." Petitioners were barred from claiming to be unable
to determine if proceedings would be closed, thus they were found
to possess the ability to bring their case in before the case had
ultimately been concluded.42 Since petitioners had ample time and
notice to bring a claim, the court declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the statute, holding that the claim was moot and
none to the exceptions of mootness were satisfied.43
In conclusion, federal and New York law both prohibit courts
from ruling in cases that fall under the doctrine of mootness unless
certain exceptions are met. The overall significance of the doctrine
of mootness is to prevent claims that have become non-existent
through some outside factor from being pushed through the
judicial system. Under both the federal and state constitutional
analysis, the respective amendments prohibit moot claims without
a qualified exception. Clear Channel solidified the court's
commitment to equivalent federal interpretation of the independent
state constitution.4
Kimberly R. McCrosson
38 Id.
39 Id
40 Clear Channel, 263 A.D.2d at 663, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 812.
41 Id at 664, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
_ Id (citing In re Westchester Rockland Newspaper, 48 N.Y.2d 430, 399
N.E.2d 518, 423 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1979) (involving a proceeding to vacate an
order which excluded the public and press from a pretrial mental competency
hearing in a criminal case)).
43 Id
4 U.S. CONST. Art III § 2. and N.Y. CONST. Art VI § 3.
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